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Abstract 
The paper analyzes how geographical clustering of beneficiaries might affect the effectiveness 
of public innovation support programs. The geographical proximity of firms operating in the 
same industry or field of technology is expected to facilitate innovation through knowledge 
spillovers and other localization advantages. Public innovation support programs may 
leverage these advantages by focusing on firms that operate in a cluster. We investigate this 
link using data from a large German program that co-funds R&D projects of SMEs in key 
technology areas called ‘Innovative SMEs’. We employ three alternative cluster measures 
which capture industry, technology and knowledge dimensions of clusters. Regardless of the 
measure, firms located in a geographical cluster are more likely to participate in the program. 
Firms being part of a knowledge-based cluster significantly increases their chance of 
receiving public financial support. We find no effects, however, of geographical clustering on 
the program’s effectiveness in terms of input or output additionality.  
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1. Introduction 
There is ample evidence that geographical clustering of economic activities can have positive 
innovation impacts for firms operating in such a cluster. These positive effects are often 
linked to localization economies (Marshall 1890), e.g. labor market pooling, supplier 
specialization, demand concentration and knowledge spillovers within industries. Innovation 
policy may try to leverage these positive cluster effects in two main ways. On the one hand, 
dedicated cluster policies attempt to actively support the emergence of (high-tech) clusters by 
providing incentives to relocate activities to a certain region, and by promoting linkages 
among actors within that region. On the other hand, the delivery of support schemes may be 
focused, either intentionally or due to self-selection by the programs’ target group, on 
beneficiaries that are part of existing clusters. In this case, positive cluster effects may 
contribute to the program’s objectives (e.g. advancing the development of new technology).  
In this paper, we look at the latter part of cluster-related policy making, and investigate 
whether geographical clustering of firms affects the effectiveness of public innovation support 
programs. This includes three distinct research questions. Firstly, we explore the role of 
clusters in a firm’s decision to apply for funding in a public innovation program. Secondly, 
we investigate whether innovation programs actually focus on clusters, i.e. if the presence in a 
geographical cluster increases the probability that a firm will receive public funding. Thirdly, 
we analyze whether firms in a cluster experience greater impacts from public funding 
compared to firms which do not belong to a cluster. Such greater impacts would indicate a 
higher effectiveness of programs that focus their resources on clusters. Our research is linked 
to prior research on the role of co-operation in R&D subsidy programs (Czarnitzki et al. 2007, 
Hottenrott and Lopez-Bento 2014, Sakakibara 2001, Branstetter and Sakakibara 2002). These 
studies do not, however, explicitly take the geographic dimension of co-operation into 
account, nor do they consider other effects of geographical clustering. By looking at cluster 
effects on programs that do not explicitly promote cluster building, our research complements 
studies on the impacts of dedicated cluster programs (Falck et al. 2010, Nishimura and 
Okamuro 2011a,b).  
We use the term ‘geographical cluster’ in this paper to denote any concentration of similar 
economic activities in a given space. The similarity in economic activities may concern 
outputs (i.e. markets) or inputs (i.e. technology). We measure output-related clusters in terms 
of the number of firms within a region operating within the same industry. Input-related 
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clusters are determined on the basis of the stock of patents in a certain field of technology. In 
addition, we use a third cluster measure relating to the stock of prior public funding activities 
in a certain knowledge area. Throughout the paper, the term ‘cluster’ denotes merely the 
geographical concentration of similar activities; we do not consider the existence or strength 
of linkages between firms in a geographical cluster.  
We link our cluster measures to firm-level data taken from an innovation support program run 
by the German federal government, named ‘Innovative SMEs’. This program started in 2007 
and provides financial support to R&D projects in SMEs’ across a large range of 
technologies. Our data include both firms that received subsidies for R&D projects and firms 
that unsuccessfully applied to the program for the first four years of program operation. Both 
groups of firms are merged with the data from the German innovation survey in order to 
analyze whether firms which are part of a cluster are more likely to participate in the program. 
We link firms to clusters on the basis of firms’ geographical location on the one hand, and the 
industry, field of technology and knowledge area, in which they are involved, on the other. By 
focusing on SMEs we avoid the problem of assigning firms with multiple locations to one 
region; literally all firms in our sample are single-location firms. 
We implement a three-step selection model of the program’s effects on input and output 
additionality. In the first step we model a firm’s decision to participate in the program. The 
second step models a firm’s success in receiving public subsidies, in the case that it applied to 
the program. The third step estimates the program’s impact on the level of R&D expenditures 
in funded firms (input additionality) and the level of (expected) sales from new products 
developed in the funded project (output additionality), using unsuccessful applicants as a 
control group. We find that firms located in a geographical cluster are more likely to 
participate in the program. The probability of receiving public funding is higher for firms in 
knowledge clusters, while we find no significant effects for industry or technology clusters. 
We do not find any impact of geographical clustering on the effectiveness of the program, 
neither for input nor for output additionality. 
In the next section, we discuss the theoretical background of our study and present the 
hypotheses that guide our empirical analysis. The methodology and data base of our analysis 
is presented in section 3. Section 4 contains the main results of the model estimations and 
section 5 summarizes the key findings and presents some conclusions on the potential role of 
geographical clustering in public innovation support. 
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2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses  
2.1.  Clusters and Innovation 
The literature on the link between geographical clusters and innovation has identified a 
variety of reasons as to why the spatial concentration of industries will promote innovation. 
Starting from Marschall’s (1890) localization externalities, producers in a cluster may benefit 
from sharing the costs of common resources, including a pool of skilled labor and access to 
specialized suppliers, and are likely to learn from each other. While localization economies 
will reduce producers’ unit costs and hence productivity through external economies of scale, 
the stimulus for innovation rests on more specific characteristics of clusters, particularly with 
respect to the nature and organization of knowledge flows within a cluster (Glaeser et al. 
1992, Cooke 2001, Audretsch and Feldman 2004). Though innovation in communication 
technologies has substantially decreased the cost of exchanging information across larger 
distances, the costs of transmitting tacit knowledge still rise with increasing distance due to 
the need for face-to-face contact, mutual understanding and common knowledge. In an 
attempt to explain the superior success of Silicon Valley as an industrial cluster, Saxenian 
(1991, 1994) stressed the role of inter-firm networks and co-operation, demonstrating how 
learning processes and knowledge spillovers within a cluster are organized (see also Harhoff 
et al. 2003). Other ways in which the exchange of knowledge may spur innovation is inter-
firm labor mobility (see Almeida and Kogut 1999), company-science links (Audretsch and 
Stephan 1996) and informal knowledge exchange networks (Tallman et al. 2004) based on 
mutual understanding and trust (Maskell 2001).  
Localized ‘knowledge hubs’ —e.g. universities or superior firms within an industry— can be 
important factors for generating localized innovations in a given industry (Jaffe 1989, 
Mansfield 1995, Jaffe et al. 1993). This is particularly the case where they produce spinoff 
companies which tend to stay in the region and fuel growth and innovation in the industry 
(Audretsch et al. 2005, Klepper 2010). Florida (2002) has stressed the positive interaction 
between the geographical concentration of talented people and the location of high-tech 
industry, re-enforcing the growth of clusters of innovative industries and human capital as the 
main input to these industries. In addition to human capital, access to specialized financial 
capital (particularly venture capital) may also reinforce innovation and growth in localized 
industries (Kortum and Lerner 2000, Chen et al. 2010, Sorensen and Stuart 2001). Porter 
(1998) has stressed the role of fierce competition among firms in a cluster as another driver 
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for superior innovation performance. The geographic concentration of an industry can also 
aide the commercialization of new knowledge by providing complementary assets along the 
value chain, both in terms of suppliers (Helsley and Strange 2002), and access to customers. 
Though several empirical studies do find positive impacts of geographical clustering (see 
Baptista and Swann 1998, Zucker et al. 1998, Folta et al. 2006, Czarnitzki and Hottenrott 
2009), the geographical clustering of firms in the same industry does not necessarily spur 
innovation. Jacobs (1969) has emphasized that it is rather sectoral diversity and the exchange 
of complementary knowledge across firms from different industries that drives innovation. 
Feldman and Audretsch (1999) provide empirical support for the existence of diversification 
externalities as key to innovation. In addition, geographical clustering of firms in the same 
industry can come at a cost, thereby limiting positive innovation externalities. Increased 
competition for scarce resources may raise the cluster firms’ costs and constitute obstacles to 
innovation, .e.g. if supply of talented personnel is limited. Van der Panne (2004) indeed finds 
a negative impact of fierce local competition on innovation. There are also a number of 
empirical studies that do not support a positive link between geographical concentration of 
economic activities and innovation performance (Martin and Sunley 2003, Kukalis 2010, 
Love and Roper 2001a,b). Shaver and Flyer (2000) show even that innovative firms tend to 
locate away from other firms in their sector, while firms that choose to agglomerate tend to 
implement inferior technologies. 
Another limiting factor is heterogeneity within a geographical cluster. If innovative 
capabilities and absorptive capacities of cluster firms differ substantially, superior firms may 
not benefit from knowledge that spills to weaker firms, nor will weaker firms be able to utilize 
this knowledge (Kukalis 2010: 455). Beaudry and Breschi (2003) find that firms located in a 
cluster with a large number of other innovative firms in the same sector, have a higher 
probability of innovating, while no such effect is seen if many non-innovative firms are 
present. McCann and Folta (2011) demonstrate that firms with higher knowledge stocks and 
younger firms benefit to a greater extent from cluster effects.  
2.2. Clusters and Innovation Policy 
Innovation policy soon noted the superior performance of high-tech clusters such as Silicon 
Valley and the Boston area and tried to develop policies to replicate these success stories in 
other locations. Cluster-oriented innovation policies became particularly popular among 
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policy makers in Europe (Tödtling and Trippl 2005). Conceptually, they could build upon 
earlier attempts to establish regional concentrations of knowledge sources and innovative 
capacities, e.g. in the context of ‘innovative growth poles’ (Perroux 1950), endogenous 
regional development (Martin and Sunley 1998) or innovative milieus (Maillat 1995). 
Innovation-oriented cluster policies also borrowed from the innovation system approach 
(Frietsch and Schüller 2010), stressing the crucial role of interactions among actors to 
stimulate knowledge flows and profit from mutual learning. 
In the past two decades, a variety of approaches have been adopted by innovation-oriented 
cluster policies (Uyarra and Ramlogan 2016). Top-down approaches actively support the 
establishment and development of industry clusters by subsidizing the relocation of firms into 
cluster regions, coordinating cluster actors and providing co-funding of innovation activities 
and R&D collaborations. Such an approach, with policy as the main driving force, can often 
be found in development contexts, but has also been adopted in European countries (see 
Fromhold-Eisebith and Eisebith 2005). Related to the top-down approach are policies that 
provide supportive infrastructures that may help firms in certain industries to strengthen their 
innovative efforts, and which might attract further actors, including start-ups, to relocate to 
the cluster region(Breschi and Malerba 2001). Such industry-specific infrastructures include 
research and education institutions, technical facilities and science parks.  
Another way in which innovation policy seeks to stimulate bottom-up (private) initiatives is 
to establish and develop clusters, e.g. by contests. In Germany, such an attempt has been 
made in the field of biotechnology through the instrument of ‘beauty contests’ (Eickelpasch 
and Fritsch 2005), or in the context of state initiatives (Falck et al. 2010). A more indirect way 
of facilitating the development of clusters is to promote R&D co-operation and other forms of 
knowledge exchange amongst firms and research organizations, particularly if co-operations 
focus on specific technologies or industry applications. While collaboration programs are 
widespread in innovation policy (see Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento 2014, Arets and Schmidt 
2008, Czarnitzki et al. 2007), most of them have no explicit regional focus and hence do not 
directly support the advance of geographical clusters in an industry. Other indirect means of 
promoting clusters include focusing existing innovation policy programs on firms that are 
already part of clusters, or to use sector or technology specific innovation programs in order 
to explicitly target regional clustering of actors when allocating funds. 
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Studies on the effectiveness of cluster policies often focus on competitiveness issues such as 
productivity, growth and the sustainability of networks in a cluster (see Uyarra and Ramlogan 
2016 for an overview of evaluations on cluster policies). Only a few studies have examined 
the impact of such policies on innovation. Nishimura and Okamuro (2011a) have studied the 
effects of participation in the Japanese Industrial Cluster Project on patenting and university 
collaboration. They did not find a significant effect of cluster participation on a firm’s R&D 
productivity, but rather showed that participating firms collaborating with partners outside the 
cluster were more productive in terms of patent output. In further research focused on the 
same cluster program, Nishimura and Okamuro (2011b) discovered that cluster participants 
making use of indirect support measures within the program (e.g. information and consulting 
services, participating in events) significantly expanded their network activities, whilst direct 
R&D subsidies had only a weak effect. Falck et al. (2010) have evaluated the impacts of a 
regional cluster program in the German state of Bavaria and found a positive effect on firms’ 
probability to innovate while R&D expenditures of firms in the program’s target industries 
substantially decreased. Other program impacts include better access to external know-how, 
greater cooperation with public scientific institutes and improved availability of suitable R&D 
personnel. A study by Viladecans-Marsal and Arauzo-Carod (2012) analyzed whether a 
cluster policy targeting knowledge-based activities in Barcelona increased the number of 
knowledge-based firms in the region, thereby demonstrating a small though significant 
program effect.  
To the best of our knowledge, there are as yet no studies which analyze the role of 
geographical clusters in terms of the effectiveness of innovation support programs, which, 
rather than aiming directly to promote the emergence of clusters, rather use the existence of 
clusters to strengthen the programs’ impacts on innovation. This paper attempts to fill this 
gap.  
2.3. Hypotheses 
The aim of our paper is to determine whether focusing program activities on firms that are 
part of a geographical cluster increases the program’s effectiveness. Such an effect can result 
from different mechanisms. Firstly, firms from clusters may deliberately self-select into the 
program and carry their cluster advantages (in terms of innovativeness) into the program. 
Secondly, program managers may deliberately focus the allocation of program funds to firms 
in clusters, expecting a higher return from these firms. Thirdly, even when controlling for 
8 
self-selection of firms and program managers, fund firms in clusters may be more effective by 
leveraging positive cluster externalities.  
The first mechanism can result from information advantage that allows firms from a cluster to 
better assess the opportunities and prospects of obtaining public funding for their innovation 
activities. Such information advantages may arise through knowledge sharing within their 
local industry and from contact with local knowledge hubs such as universities or specialized 
technology transfer institutions. This is particularly true of programs that are rather 
demanding in the way planned innovation activities must be presented, or that require the 
building of consortia of project partners in order to be eligible for funding. For innovation 
programs that focus on technologies relevant to the innovation activities of the industries 
represented in a cluster, firms located in a cluster may subsequently have a head start in terms 
of receiving and assessing program information. Better information equates to lower 
application costs for the relevant program, providing greater incentives for firms in a cluster 
to participate in a program. Our first hypothesis is hence: 
H1: Firms located in a cluster show a higher probability to apply for public 
funding for innovation, particularly if the technology focus of funding programs is 
related to the clusters technology focus. 
The second mechanism is related to the tender procedures of innovation programs, implying 
that only a limited number of applicants receive funding. The selection of applicants is 
typically based on pre-defined criteria, which often combine obligatory requirements and 
qualitative aspects. For the latter, peer-reviews by experts, as well as a degree of discretion on 
the part of program administrators is typical for many innovation programs in Europe, 
including the ‘Innovative SMEs’ program. As program managers are expected to run the 
program in such a way as to ensure that it will best meet its objectives, they are incentivized 
to select those applicants who they think will produce the highest returns. Having limited 
information about the future innovative capabilities of applicants, managers may use a firm’s 
location in a geographical cluster as a signal for higher innovative potentials. Program 
managers may also expect that these firms can profit from spillovers from other actors in the 
cluster, which may also increase the returns from the funds provided from the program to 
other cluster firms.  
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H2: Firms located in a cluster show a higher probability to receive public funding 
for innovation, particularly if the technology focus of funding programs is related 
to the clusters technology focus. 
The third mechanism is linked to this assumed expectation of program managers. If firms in a 
cluster can exploit cluster externalities for more and better innovation activities, their 
investment in R&D and new products will be more productive. This positive cluster effect on 
innovation output may be limited by counteracting mechanisms, however. A strong focus on 
collaboration with local actors and priority on using localised knowledge may lead to lock-in 
and a lack of openness for new developments happening outside the cluster (Boschma 2005). 
This may be particularly harmful if new technological trends and new demand preferences 
emerge outside of a firm’s cluster and firms in a cluster recognize such new trends later than 
firms outside the cluster. But we still hypothesize a positive link between geographical 
clustering and innovation output for the specific program we look at because of the program’s 
focus on SMEs that are technologically leading in their markets. Such firms should be capable 
to be open to global developments in their field and at the same time utilise the advantages of 
local clusters. 
H3: Firms located in a cluster and receiving public funding for innovation show 
higher innovation results at a given level of innovation inputs. 
3. Methodology and Data 
3.1. The ‘Innovative SMEs’ Scheme 
In 2007, the German federal government introduced a new scheme within its technology 
programs in order to provide better funding opportunities for SMEs. The scheme offers 
subsidies to SMEs for R&D projects, along with co-funding for project partners from industry 
or universities, covering a wide area of technology fields. In contrast to the government’s 
standard technology programs, ‘Innovative SMEs’ publishes tenders twice a year on fixed 
dates (mid- April and mid- October). The tenders do not predefine technological problems to 
be tackled in R&D projects but are open to all types of R&D within a certain field of 
technology. The scheme guarantees a quick evaluation of project proposals and reduces 
compliance costs of application through a two-step procedure. In a first step, a short (ten 
page) project outline must be submitted which is subject to evaluation by the program 
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administration and an external expert panel. Projects selected in this stage must later submit a 
full proposal which will be checked for formal correctness only. 
The scheme is administered by program agencies commissioned by the federal government. 
Each agency is specialized in a certain field of technology and does not only run the 
‘Innovative SMEs’ scheme, but also a number of other federal and regional technology 
programs in their respective field. For this study, we use data from the first four years of the 
scheme, covering seven fields of technology (ICT, biotechnology, nanotechnology, photonics, 
production technologies, environmental technologies, safety technologies). The seven fields 
were administered by 14 different program agencies. 
The scheme funds R&D projects that are either carried out by an SME alone or in co-
operation with other firms, universities or public research organizations. The vast majority of 
funded projects (more than 80 percent) are co-operative projects. The scheme provides grants 
to SMEs and to their project partners to cover the direct costs of the R&D project. For SMEs, 
public subsidies typically cover 50 percent of the SME’s total project costs. In the case that 
the project focuses on basic research (which is very rarely the case), or if the SME is located 
in a disadvantaged region (i.e. East Germany), the subsidy rate may be somewhat higher. 
Project partners from universities or public research organizations may be refunded up to 100 
percent of their project costs by the scheme.  
The selection procedure is essentially based on the evaluation of a ten-page project summary. 
The evaluation combines a peer review process by external experts and a selection session 
involving the external experts as well as the program managers and sometimes representatives 
from the federal government. In the first four years of the scheme, the average rate of funded 
projects in the total number of submitted projects was 24 percent. The average project that 
received funding had total R&D costs of around €1.1m and ran for 2.5 years. SMEs received 
public subsidies of approximately €0.25m per project. In the first four years (2007 to 2010), a 
total of 2,836 project proposals were submitted to the scheme, involving 3,300 different 
SMEs. 675 proposals were selected for public funding, involving 1,036 different SMEs. The 
total volume of these projects was €784m, of which €482m were funded from federal sources. 
The SMEs’ contribution to total project costs totaled €578m, and the government contribution 
to their R&D costs was €307m.  
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3.2. Empirical Model 
We evaluate the effects of clusters on the effectiveness of the ‘Innovative SMEs’ program by 
employing a control group design and a selection-correction approach of the Heckman (1979) 
type. The reason for choosing a selection-correction model instead of a matching procedure 
often used in evaluation R&D subsidy programs (see Hussinger 2008, Almus and Czarnitzki 
2003, Görg and Strobl 2007) is related to our specific research question. We are interested in 
the interaction effect of receiving public subsidies and being located in a geographical cluster. 
As the latter is rather a continuous characteristic (i.e. a firm is to a lower or higher degree part 
of a cluster) we use continuous cluster measures. This implies that we cannot split our sample 
into distinct groups of firms that would combine the two events ‘receiving subsidies’ and 
‘located in a cluster’, as would be required for a matching procedure. We prefer a selection-
correction model over a combination of matching and regressing on program output for a 
matched group of treated and non-treated firms as we have strong and valid instruments. A 
selection-correction model is also more flexible when controlling for other subsidies which 
firms in the control group may have received. 
The empirical strategy consists of three steps, each step linked to one research question. The 
first model estimates the choice (c) of firms to participate in the program. In the second step, 
and considering the selection effect from the choice in the first step, we explore the 
determinants of a firm to being selected for funding (s) in the program. The third step models 
the impacts of program funding on the innovative performance (y) based on a difference-in-
difference approach, again controlling for a potential selection bias. In each step, a vector of 
geographical clustering variables (gc) is included. In the output model (step 3), we interact 
this vector with the policy variable s in order to identify potential positive effectiveness 
impacts of allocating subsidies to beneficiaries from clusters. Selection biases are controlled 
for by including the estimated inverse Mills ratio () from step 1 in step 2, and from step 2 in 
step 3. In step 1, we use information on the SME’s general innovative capacity as instruments 
z which determines a firm’s decision to participate in the program while at the same time not 
affecting the funding decision s. In step two, information on the available budget and the 
share of firms in the program’s main target group that have been previously funded serve as 
instruments (see section 3.4 for more details on the instruments). In each model, a group of 
control variables (x) is used to capture firm-specific and technology-specific effects on the 
firms’ and program managers’ choices and the firms’ innovation performance (see the section 
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on variables below). These control variables also include the instruments required to identify 
a potential selection bias. 
The three models to be estimated read as follows: 
ci = c + ccxi + c czi + c gci + ci [1] 
si = s + ssxi + c czi + s gci + ci + si for ci > 0  [2] 
yi = y + yyxi + y gc i +  si +  (si gci) + si + yi for ci > 0  [3] 
with i representing a firm, a being a constant, , , ,  and  being parameters to be 
estimated and  being a firm-specific error term. 
Model [1] includes both firms that applied for funding in the program and firms that are part 
of the program’s target group but did not apply for funding. Model [2] is restricted to firms 
that applied for funding in the scheme. In models [2] and [3] we only consider firms that 
applied for funding through the ‘Innovative SMEs’ scheme (ci > 0). The control group for 
evaluating the impacts of the scheme on innovation performance (model [3]) includes 
unsuccessful applicants who either refrained from pursuing the proposed project, or who 
completed the project without any subsidies from the scheme, funding it either entirely from 
internal sources, or using public subsidies from other programs. Our control variables include 
indicators to describe the different categories of unsuccessful applicants.  
3.3. Data 
In order to estimate the three models, we require data on firms that participated in the 
‘Innovative SMEs’ scheme, as well as firms from the target group of the program that did not 
submit a proposal. For the former group we require data both at the time at which a firm 
submits a proposal (in order to estimate models [1] and [2]), and following completion of the 
project that was submitted for funding (for model [3]). This information was collected in two 
telephone surveys of all SMEs that submitted a project proposal in the first seven tenders of 
the scheme (two tenders in 2007 to 2009 each plus the first tender in 2010). For the latter 
group, we use information from the German innovation survey. 
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The first telephone survey of SMEs participating in the ‘Innovative SMEs’ scheme, included 
a total of 2,857 different firms.1 The survey was conducted around one and a half years after 
the funding decision had been made. For each SME we contacted the person responsible for 
the project proposal by telephone. We were unable to contact 552 SMEs, either because the 
person responsible for the project proposal was unavailable or telephone numbers were 
invalid, or because the firm denied having participated in the scheme. 199 SMEs refused to 
participate in the survey. 2,106 SMEs responded to the telephone survey and provided 
information on project and firm characteristics. This equates to a return rate corrected for 
neutral losses of 91.4 percent.  
A second survey targeted all SMEs when the projects which they submitted to the scheme, 
should have been completed (according to the time table presented in the proposal). The 
survey was conducted in spring 2011. Since most projects ran for a period of at least 2.5 
years, only firms from the first three tenders were included in this survey. Of the 734 SMEs 
that qualified for the survey, 107 of these firms were classified as neutral losses as we were 
unable to contact them. 65 firms refused to participate in the survey. 562 SMEs provided 
information on the outcome of the projects which they had submitted to the scheme, giving a 
net response rate of 89.6 percent. The response rate was higher among firms subsidized under 
the scheme (94.5 percent) than it was amongst firms which had not received a subsidy from 
the scheme (88.1 percent). Of the 562 SMEs which provided information, 28 percent received 
funding from the ‘Innovative SMEs’ scheme for their project, 11 percent were rejected by the 
scheme but managed to receive funding for the same project from other public innovation 
programs.2 20 percent executed the proposed project without public funding. The remaining 
41 percent did not pursue the project after it was rejected by the ‘Innovative SMEs’ scheme. 
In order to collect information on firms from the target group of the program that did not 
submit a proposal to the scheme, we use firm-level data from the German part of the 
Community Innovation Survey, which is managed by the Centre for European Economic 
Research (ZEW) in Mannheim. This survey is a panel survey (called Mannheim Innovation 
Panel – MIP) which is conducted annually (see Peters and Rammer 2013 for more details). 
We used the survey waves 2008 to 2011 which cover firm activities in the years 2007 to 2010. 
                                                 
1 Note that some firms participated in several tenders. In such cases, data on the first participation was collected. 
2 In addition to ‘Innovative SMEs’, the federal government offers another large program to finance R&D projects in SMEs, 
called ‚Central Innovation Program for SMEs’ (ZIM). This program considerably increased its funding volume in 2009 and 
2010 in response to the economic crisis.  
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We restrict the sample to SMEs (i.e. less than 250 employees and less than €50m annual 
sales) which engage in in-house innovation activities and which are operating in markets that 
are the main target sectors of the technology programs of the federal government. We 
determine these target sectors by examining the sector distribution of firms that received 
funding from these technology programs in the years 2002 to 2007. The target sectors include 
all manufacturing sectors (NACE rev. 2 10 to 33), as well as energy supply (35), waste 
disposal and recycling (38 to 39), air transport and logistics (51 to 52), broadcasting, 
telecommunication and computer services (60 to 63), consulting, technical and R&D services 
(70 to 72), and creative services (74). Firms that have submitted a project proposal to 
‘Innovative SMEs’ were removed from the control group sample by matching all program 
participants with the MIP sample based on names and addresses. The total number of 
observations in the control group is 4,884.  
3.4. Variables 
Our key variables of interest are indicators on geographical clustering of firms. We 
distinguish three types of clusters: industry, technology and knowledge. Industry clusters 
represent an agglomeration of firms from the same industry in a certain region. We use a 
simple measure - the number of firms in an industry and region. Industries are defined at the 
two-digit NACE level3. Data on the number of firms per industry is taken from the Mannheim 
Enterprise Panel, essentially a business register for Germany (see Bersch et al. 2014), using 
2010 as the reference year. 
Technology clusters represent geographical agglomerations of related technological activities. 
We rely on patent data, using the count of patents applied at the European Patent Office 
(EPO) and through the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) at the World Intellectual Property 
Organization in Geneva. Patent data are taken from EPO’s Patstat database and cover the 
priority years 1998 to 2008. Patents are assigned to regions based on the inventor location, 
using fractional counting in the case of inventors from different regions. We use two methods 
in order to determine whether a firm is located in a geographical technology cluster. The first 
methods consists in assigning patents to the seven fields of technology that were targeted by 
the ‘Innovative SMEs’ scheme, employing an IPC-based classification of technology fields 
                                                 
3 NACE is the official industry classification used in the European Union. It is largely equivalent to international industry 
classifications of the United Nations (ISIC). 
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proposed by Schmoch (2008). This method can be used only for SMEs that applied to the 
program (c > 0) as we have no direct information on fields of technology for firms that did not 
apply to the program.4 In order to obtain a technology cluster variable for the latter firms, we 
use an indirect method, assigning patents to industries, using the concordance between 
technology fields (as reported by IPC codes in patent files) and 3-digit NACE rev. 1.1 sectors 
proposed by Schmoch et al. (2003). For each firm, we count the number of patents applied for 
by inventors located in a firm’s region, that are assigned to the firm’s industry code. Since the 
concordance is only available for manufacturing firms, the second technology cluster 
indicator cannot be obtained for service firms. 
A knowledge cluster refers to knowledge generating activities that are concentrated in a 
certain region. We focus on knowledge that is relevant for the fields of technology targeted by 
the ‘Innovative SMEs’ scheme. We measure the stock of knowledge by ascertaining the total 
amount of federal funding allocated for R&D in the respective field of technology in the eight 
years prior to the start of the program (2000 to 2007).5 Federal R&D funding includes both 
project-based funding for universities, research institutes and enterprises as well as 
institutional funding for government research labs. Data is taken from the so-called ‘Profi’ 
database of the federal government which contains data on all R&D projects that received 
federal funding through technology programs, as well as federal institutional funding streams 
(see Aschhoff 2010). We again use two different methods in order to assign this stock of 
knowledge to SMEs. One method consists in directly assigning this knowledge stock on the 
basis of the field of technology for an SME applied for funding. This method is only feasible 
for SMEs with c > 0. For the other SMEs, we assign knowledge stocks via industry codes. For 
this purpose, we examine the distribution of all federal technology funding to firms during 
2000 to 2007 according to field of technology and the firms’ industry. For each 2-digit 
industry, we calculate the share of each of the seven fields of technology in total federal 
technology funding, also considering fields of technology beyond the seven fields covered by 
the ‘Innovative SMEs’ scheme. The firm-specific knowledge cluster indicator is calculated by 
weighting the funding volume in a technology field against the share of this field in total 
federal technology funding for the 2-digit industry of the SME, and totaling these weighted 
funding volumes across the seven fields.  
                                                 
4 One could use the patent stock of firms with c = 0 to determine their technology focus, but only a small fraction of these 
firms (around 20 percent) show patenting activity in the past ten years.  
5 Although the ‘Innovative SMEs’ scheme started in 2007, no financial flows occurred in that year. 
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Apart from the second technology indication for which we use the 2-digit level, the data for 
the cluster variables are measured at the 3-digit NUTS level6. There are more than 400 
NUTS3 areas in Germany. Their size varies considerably. The average area of NUTS3 unit is 
around 1,000 km2 and the average population is around 200,000. In order to calculate cluster 
variables, we define a region for each firm. This region includes all NUTS areas whose 
geographical centre is within a 50 km distance from the firm’s location. This means that the 
NUTS area in which a firm is located is always part of the region, while for many firms 
neighbouring NUTS areas are also included, particularly in large metropolitan areas 
consisting of several NUTS areas (such as the Ruhr).7  
We assume that geographical cluster effects will be stronger the larger a cluster. Cluster size 
is measured both in absolute terms (i.e. stock of firms, stock of patents, allocated Federal 
funding) and through a relative measure. The relative measure represents the share of a region 
in all activities within an industry, a technology field or a knowledge area. This specification 
enables the identification of geographical clusters in industries, fields or areas of a small size. 
We also control for differences in the size of regions by including the logarithm of a region’s 
GDP in the estimation. This measure is intended to capture general agglomeration effects and 
should ensure that the cluster variables only capture cluster-related effects.8  
The dependent variables of models [1] and [2] are indicator variables that take the value 1 if a 
firm submitted a project proposal to the scheme [1], or if the project proposal was selected for 
funding by the program administration [2]. For the output model [3], we use two alternative 
dependent variables which capture different aspects of program effectiveness, input 
additionality (see Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento 2013) and output additionality (see Hottenrott 
and Lopes-Bento 2014). Input additionality is measured by the change in the ratio of R&D 
expenditure over sales between the year prior to the start of the project (which is 2007 or 
2008) and the year in which the project ended (2010 or 2011). We use the R&D to sales ratio 
rather than the absolute amount of R&D expenditure in order to better control for the varying 
                                                 
6 NUTS is the official regional classification used in the European Union. 
7 We also tested alternative definitions of regions (e.g. using only the NUTS area in which a firm is located, or using a larger 
distance threshold) which yielded very similar results. 
8 Note that the size of the region and the knowledge cluster variables are highly correlated since the size of a knowledge 
cluster is strongly driven by the presence of universities and research institutes, which both tend to be located in larger 
regions which may cause multicollinearity issues. Variance inflation factors are below the 5.0 threshold, however, and 
indicate that multicollinearity is not a major problem in model estimations. We also estimated model variants excluding size 
of the region and found almost identical results for our cluster variables. Results of these model estimations can be obtained 
from the authors upon request. 
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business cycle situations of firms. The period covered by our study, 2007 to 2011, was 
characterized by a severe economic recession in 2009, with a drop in real GDP in Germany of 
5 percent. Many firms experienced a sharp decline in sales and had to adjust their expenditure, 
including R&D spending, accordingly. Economic recovery took place at a varying pace in 
each sector. By relating R&D expenditure to the firm’s sales volume we attempt to capture 
the different impacts of the economic crisis on individual firms. Note that no R&D 
expenditure data from the recession year 2009 is used in the input additionality model. 
Output additionality is measured in terms of the sales generated by new products that resulted 
from the project submitted to the scheme. Since the vast majority of R&D projects submitted 
to the ‘Innovative SMEs’ scheme aimed at developing new products, we believe that this 
variable is a fair indicator of project success, particularly as the scheme intends to support 
new product development (as does most other SME-related R&D programs in Germany). 
New product sales are often the preferred output measure for product innovation (see OECD 
and Eurostat 2005). We are aware, however, that the measure is still a crude proxy as it does 
not capture other relevant output dimensions of projects (i.e. developing generic 
knowledge/technologies used, out-licensing) and as the submitted project may be subject to 
spillovers to and from other innovative activities in the firm. We exclude firms with projects 
that did not aim at developing product innovations from this part of the analysis. To control 
for size effects, this sales figure is divided by the firms’ sales level in the year the project 
ended. Information on these variables is taken from the second telephone survey. Given that 
this survey was conducted close to the (planned) end of the project, not all firms had yet 
generated sales with new products. These firms were asked to estimate the likely annual sales 
volume of the product innovations developed in the course of the project, and we took this 
estimate as the output measure.  
In the first model, a firm’s capacity to innovate serves as an instrument to control for a 
potential selection bias. Since ‘Innovative SMEs’ is a rather demanding scheme in terms of 
the ability of a firm to develop and apply new technology, firms would need to have sufficient 
in-house resources to be able to prepare a competitive proposal. We use the R&D to sales 
ratio and the share of graduates employed by firms (both measured for the year prior to 
application) as proxies for this capacity. Both variables have proven to have a strong impact 
on the participation decision while they neither effect the funding decision, nor show 
correlation with the residuum of the first model. 
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In the second model, supply and demand restrictions are used as instruments. On the supply 
side, we use the budget available per submitted proposal and field of technology in each 
tender. If budgets are tight, program managers may have to reject proposals despite their high 
quality, whereas abundant budgets may stimulate generous selection decisions as program 
managers are incentivized to spend most of their budget to avoid cuts in subsequent years. On 
the demand side, one must consider that the potential of SMEs in Germany which conduct 
high-level R&D in the various fields of technology is limited, and many of these SMEs have 
received public funding in previous years from federal technology programs. We observe the 
number of SMEs that received funding from technology programs in the field in which they 
submitted a proposal to the ‘Innovative SMEs’ scheme and divide this number by the number 
of SMEs with a high R&D intensity (7 percent or more) that are active in the respective field 
of technology. The latter figure is taken from the results of the German innovation survey, 
assigning firms to fields of technology based on their 4-digit industry code. Both variables 
have proven to be strong instruments which have explaining the funding decision while 
showing no correlation with the performance variables in model 3. 
In all three models, following the literature on microeconometric modeling of innovation 
program impacts (Takalo et al. 2013, Wallsten 2000, Lach 2002, Hussinger 2008, Berube and 
Mohnen 2009, Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento 2012, 2014), we use a number of control variables 
(see Table A1 in the Appendix) including size, age, sector, export activity, access to external 
financing (proxied by a credit rating index of Germany’s largest credit rating agency, 
Creditreform) and, since there is still a preferential treatment of East German firms in public 
innovation programs (i.e. higher subsidy rates), whether a firm is located in Eastern Germany. 
In the model of firm decisions to participate in the scheme, we consider prior experience in 
participating in federal technology programs or in other public innovation programs. In the 
second model on the program administration’s decision to fund a project, we capture 
characteristics of the proposed project (strategic focus, technological ambition, barriers that 
affected the process of drafting the proposal, active guidance by the program administration 
when completing the proposal). Control variables of the output model include the R&D to 
sales ratio at the project start, the patent stock per employee at the project start, the strategic 
focus of the project, and whether the project was conducted in cooperation with others. The 
input additionality model also contains an indicator capturing difficulties in providing own 
resources to co-fund the project. The output additionality model also includes the change in 
R&D to sales ratio between the project start and end, to control for the size of R&D 
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investment made during the project. In both additionality models we consider two policy 
variables (funding from the ‘Innovative SMEs’ scheme and funding from any other public 
program). The input additionality model also includes an indicator for firms that completed 
the rejected project without public funding. Descriptive statistics of all model variables, 
including the source of data for each variable, are shown in tables A1 and A2 in the 
Appendix, while tables A3 to A6 contain correlation coefficients for each of the four models. 
4. Estimation Results 
Table 1 presents the estimation results for a SMEs’ decision to participate in the ‘Innovative 
SMEs’ scheme. Geographical clustering plays a decisive role in this decision. SMEs located 
in clusters are significantly more likely to submit a proposal to the program. We hence find 
support for our first hypothesis. This result holds for all three types of cluster variables when 
measuring clusters based on the absolute size of activities. For the alternative specification 
based on the share of a region’s activities in terms of the national total, only the knowledge 
cluster variable shows a significant impact. The geographical clustering effect seems to be 
stronger for knowledge clusters and less strong for industry and technology clusters. The 
result may indicate that firms in a cluster are more aware of funding opportunities and tend to 
be more receptive to government support schemes. It may also indicate, however, that 
government agencies and intermediaries (such as technology transfer offices) are more active 
in promoting funding opportunities in cluster regions. Since we have no record of the regional 
distribution of such promotion activities, we cannot control for the impact of these activities 
on firm choices. 
Prior experience with public innovation programs is a major factor in a firm’s decision to seek 
funding as part of the ‘Innovative SMEs’ scheme. Firms that participated in Federal 
technology programs show a 3.5 percentage point higher propensity to submit a project 
proposal to the scheme. Experience with other R&D programs raises this propensity by 
around 6 percent. Another main driver of an SME’s decision to participate in the program is 
its innovative capacity. R&D intensity and human capital are two highly important 
determinants. Larger and younger SMEs show a higher propensity to submit proposals. Firms 
selling on international markets are also more likely to seek public funding. Interestingly, 
firms from East Germany show a significantly lower propensity to apply to the ‘Innovative  
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Table 1: Estimation results of firms’ choices to participate in the program (model 1): marginal 
effects of cross-section probit models 
Industry cluster Technology cluster Knowledge cluster All three clusters Dependent variable:  
Participation in 
‘Innovative SMEs’  
absolute 
measure 
relative 
measure 
absolute 
measure 
relative 
measure 
absolute 
measure 
relative 
measure 
absolute 
measure 
relative 
measure 
0.143*** 0.002  0.143*** 0.002Industry  
cluster  (0.056) (0.002)  (0.055) (0.002)
 0.105*** 0.003  0.095** 0.001Technology  
clustera  (0.039) (0.004)  (0.039) (0.004)
 0.330** 0.009*** 0.361** 0.010***Knowledge  
cluster  (0.165) (0.003) (0.165) (0.003)
0.034** 0.034** 0.034** 0.034** 0.034** 0.035** 0.034** 0.035**Prior participation in 
technology programs (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.060***Prior participation in 
other R&D programs (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
0.438*** 0.437*** 0.435*** 0.436*** 0.434*** 0.431*** 0.434*** 0.430***R&D to sales ratio 
before project start (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
0.236*** 0.238*** 0.236*** 0.238*** 0.238*** 0.237*** 0.235*** 0.237***Share of graduates 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
-0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008Credit rating 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
0.083*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.082*** 0.081***Export activity prior 
to application (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.030***No. of employees  
(log) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
-0.093*** -0.093*** -0.092*** -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.093***Age (log) 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.002 -0.009 0.000 -0.011Size of the region  
(log) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Pseudo R2 0.324 0.323 0.324 0.323 0.324 0.325 0.326 0.325
VIF (mean) 2.44 2.46 2.03 2.00 2.07 2.12 2.41 2.42
No. of observations 6,701 6,701 6,701 6,701 6,701 6,701 6,701 6,701
***, **, *: statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level. Standard errors in parentheses. All models include industry 
dummies, time dummies (indicating the year a firm applied for funding) and a dummy for a location in Eastern Germany. 
a  Technology cluster information is available for manufacturing firms only; for service firms, the technology cluster 
variable was set to 0, and an indicator variable was added to the model indicating this data modification. 
SMEs’ scheme. This primarily reflects the extensive supply of other R&D support programs 
for this part of Germany (including programs co-funded by EU Structural Funds) which 
typically show a much higher success rate for applications.9 A firm’s credit rating does not 
affect the decision on program participation while we find significant heterogeneity across 
sectors.  
                                                 
9 The lower propensity of program participation for East German firms is not related to a lower innovation propensity. Firms 
from East Germany show a similar share of innovators and R&D performers as firms in West Germany (see Rammer et al. 
2016).  
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Turning to our second hypotheses, we find some support that the program administration 
tends to choose proposals from firms located in knowledge clusters. We find a positive impact 
for both specifications of this cluster variable (see table 2), though the significance level of 
the cluster effects is lower than those found for a firm’s decision to participate in the scheme. 
We do not find any significant effects for industry clusters and only a statistically very weak 
effect for technology clusters. When interpreting this result, one should keep in mind that 
program managers will have only restricted information on the existence of clusters. They 
might be well aware of knowledge clusters in their knowledge area since they are typically 
involved in providing funding for R&D projects to the main actors in such clusters 
(universities, government labs, large companies, high-tech start-ups). They have a much less 
comprehensive overview, however, of the regional distribution of patent activities in their 
field of technology, particularly as most program managers are specialized in a subfield 
within the seven technology areas covered by the program. They will also have little 
information on the existence of industry clusters, particularly if many firms in a cluster are not 
conducting R&D at the technological frontier.  
Firm characteristics only play a minor role for the selection of a positive evaluation of a 
proposal by the program management. We find a weak negative effect of firm age, i.e. 
younger firms proof to be somewhat preferred over older ones. There are almost no sector 
effects. Strong effects can be found for a firm’s prior experience with public innovation 
programs. Firms having received subsidies either from Federal technology programs or from 
other schemes, are more likely to receive funding for their ‘Innovative SMEs’ project. There 
is also a strong positive effect for firms that were unsuccessful with their project proposal in 
an earlier tender round, but which submitted another proposal (or a re-worked version of their 
original proposal) in a later tender. Around 4 percent of all SMEs that were unsuccessful in a 
tender submitted a proposal in a later tender, with approximately 80 percent of them being 
successful in the second trial. This suggests a learning effect.  
Characteristics of the proposed project are highly relevant for success in the scheme. Program 
managers tend to chose projects that focus on strategic R&D rather than on further developing 
established technologies. Co-operative projects have an advantage over individual projects. 
The projects of firms which reported that the list of technologies targeted by the scheme was 
too narrow were more likely to fail. Equally, the projects of firms which had difficulty  
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Table 2: Estimation results of program management choice to provide funding (model 2): 
marginal effects of cross-section probit models 
Industry cluster Technology cluster Knowledge cluster All three clusters Dependent variable: 
Receiving subsidies 
from ‘Innovative SMEs’ 
absolu-
te meas. 
relative 
measure 
absolu-
te meas. 
relative 
measure
absolu-
te meas. 
relative 
measure 
absolu-
te meas. 
relative 
measure 
0.002 0.031  0.002 0.045Industry  
cluster  (0.004) (0.105)  (0.004) (0.105)
 0.016* 0.015  0.013 0.010Technology  
cluster   (0.010) (0.075)  (0.010) (0.077)
 0.012** 0.577* 0.012** 0.597**Knowledge  
cluster  (0.006) (0.313) (0.006) (0.302)
0.063** 0.064** 0.064** 0.064** 0.067** 0.065** 0.068** 0.065**Prior participation in  
technology programs (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029)
0.066** 0.066** 0.064** 0.066** 0.070** 0.067** 0.069** 0.068**Prior participation in  
other R&D programs (0.029) (0.032) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030)
0.100*** 0.101*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.100*** 0.101***Prior participation in 
‘Innovative SMEs’a (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.032)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000Credit rating 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003No. of employees 
(log) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
-0.028 -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 -0.032* -0.030* -0.032* -0.031Age (log) 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020)
0.014 0.015 0.013 0.015 -0.012 -0.004 -0.013 -0.005Size of the region (log) 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
0.085*** 0.085*** 0.084*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.084*** 0.086***Project focuses on 
strategic research (0.029) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030)
-0.110 -0.111* -0.110 -0.112 -0.120* -0.115* -0.118 -0.117*Project further develops 
established technologies (0.072) (0.067) (0.070) (0.073) (0.063) (0.065) (0.075) (0.065)
0.112*** 0.111*** 0.112*** 0.111*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.110***Cooperative project 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.039) (0.037) (0.035)
-0.109*** -0.109*** -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.112*** -0.111***Barrier: scheme misses 
fields of technology (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.035) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037)
-0.113** -0.114** -0.114** -0.115** -0.114** -0.114** -0.113** -0.115**Barrier: difficulties in 
providing own resources  (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.054) (0.051) (0.052) (0.054) (0.053)
0.133*** 0.133*** 0.135*** 0.133*** 0.133*** 0.133*** 0.135*** 0.133***Active guidance by 
program administration  (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
0.343*** 0.344*** 0.342*** 0.342*** 0.345*** 0.345*** 0.344*** 0.344***Available budget per 
proposal (m€) (0.041) (0.037) (0.040) (0.037) (0.038) (0.041) (0.039) (0.040)
-0.560*** -0.560*** -0.561*** -0.562*** -0.566*** -0.559*** -0.566*** -0.559***Share of SME potential 
previously funded  (0.109) (0.112) (0.122) (0.105) (0.113) (0.110) (0.104) (0.116)
0.010 0.011 0.013 0.012 0.025 0.019 0.027 0.022Inverse Mills ratio 
from model 1 (0.039) (0.038) (0.037) (0.039) (0.040) (0.038) (0.040) (0.039)
Pseudo R2 0.116 0.116 0.117 0.116 0.118 0.117 0.119 0.118
VIF (mean) 3.94 3.96 2.40 2.37 2.45 2.51 3.98 3.97
No. of observations 1,712 1,712 1,712 1,712 1,712 1,712 1,712 1,712
***, **, *: statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level. Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors are estimated 
using bootstrapping with 500 replications. All models include industry dummies, time dummies (indicating the year a firm 
applied for funding) and a dummy for a location in Eastern Germany. 
a  Firms that submitted revised project proposals which have been rejected in an earlier tender round as well as SMEs that 
have been successful with a project application in an earlier tender round and submitted another project. 
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providing their own resources for the R&D project were likely to fail. Firms that contacted the 
program administration to seek advice when completing the proposals had a significantly 
better chance of receiving funding.  
Supply and demand restrictions are highly relevant for the selection choice of program 
managers. If the number of submitted proposals per available budget in a certain field of 
technology is low, more projects receive funding. This is straightforward since project size 
and the amount of required co-funding from the state per project do not significantly vary 
within a field of technology. If managers wish to exploit the available budget, their main 
parameter is the number of projects which receive funding. If the number of SMEs within a 
certain field of technology that received funding from the ‘Innovative SME’ scheme is high 
compared to the estimated potential of SMEs in that field, the probability of them receiving 
funding decreases. This essentially reflects the program management’s attempt to focus 
funding on ambitious projects. 
We do not find a statistically positive impact of the inverse Mills ratio in model 2, implying 
that the explanatory variables used in model 1 are sufficient for modeling an SMEs’ choice to 
participating in the program, and that there are no unobserved variables that may affect both 
the decision to participate in the program and the probability of receiving funding. In fact, the 
group of program participants seems to be quite homogenous and clearly differs from the 
average innovative SME in Germany, particularly with respect to innovative capacity. The 
average R&D intensity of program participants is 0.22 (R&D expenditure over sales), 
compared to 0.1 for the average innovative SME in the sectors targeted by the program. 
Program success does not depend on R&D intensity, however,10 but is strongly driven by 
project characteristics.  
When turning to the third stage of our models (and to hypothesis 3), geographical clusters do 
not show any impact on input or output additionality. We find statistically significant positive 
impacts neither from the cluster variables, nor from the interaction between cluster and 
funding variables (tables 3 and 4). The result is consistent for both specifications of our 
cluster variables. There are also no positive cluster effects for firms having received subsidies  
 
                                                 
10 R&D intensity at the time of application is not statistically different between successful and unsuccessful program 
participants, and the variable is insignificant if included in model 2. 
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Table 3: Estimation results of input additionality of the ‘Innovative SMEs’ scheme (model 3): 
marginal effects of cross-section OLS models 
No interaction eff. Industry cluster Technology cluster Knowledge cluster Dependent variable:  
Change in R&D to 
sales ratio  
absolute 
measure 
relative 
measure 
absolute 
measure 
relative 
measure 
absolute 
measure 
relative 
measure 
absolute 
measure 
relative 
measure 
-0.062 -0.589 0.017 -0.224   Cluster variable: 
industry cluster (0.195) (0.647) (0.225) (1.062)   
-0.084 0.152 -0.147 -12.992  Cluster variable: 
technology cluster (0.102) (10.433) (0.130) (11.233)  
0.019 0.101  0.240 0.482Cluster variable: 
knowledge cluster (0.253) (0.730)  (0.287) (0.890)
0.088** 0.083** 0.084* 0.049 0.068 0.040 0.092** 0.083*‘Innovative SMEs’ 
funding (0.039) (0.038) (0.047) (0.054) (0.051) (0.054) (0.040) (0.049)
0.191*** 0.192*** 0.172** 0.314*** 0.186** 0.201** 0.202*** 0.186**Other public  
funding (0.064) (0.063) (0.078) (0.086) (0.083) (0.087) (0.074) (0.080)
0.015 0.016 0.074 0.073 -0.002 -0.031 0.056 0.052Project completed 
without public funding (0.040) (0.043) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.059) (0.048) (0.048)
 0.041 1.620 0.127 24.331 -0.152 -0.031Interaction: cluster &  
‘Innovative SMEs’   (0.453) (1.654) (0.225) (21.431) (0.345) (0.984)
 0.200 -3.631** 0.033 -3.994 -0.271 0.094Interaction: cluster &  
other funding  (0.591) (1.735) (0.320) (25.956) (1.275) (3.033)
 -0.530* 0.000 0.105 23.401 -0.879** -2.031Interaction: cluster &  
no public funding  (0.303) (0.000) (0.234) (22.818) (0.427) (1.314)
-0.683*** -0.680*** -0.671*** -0.685*** -0.685*** -0.691*** -0.685*** -0.687***R&D to sales before 
project start (0.084) (0.079) (0.087) (0.085) (0.083) (0.083) (0.079) (0.082)
-0.003 -0.014 -0.009 -0.016 0.006 0.002 -0.011 -0.013Patent stock at 
project start (0.151) (0.139) (0.167) (0.119) (0.136) (0.138) (0.123) (0.110)
-0.003 -0.004 -0.649 -2.058 -0.499 -1.003 -0.100 -0.429Cooperative 
project (0.050) (0.049) (4.815) (5.212) (4.972) (4.907) (5.065) (4.840)
0.024 0.026 0.026 0.033 0.026 0.031 0.020 0.023Strategic 
Research (0.049) (0.047) (0.045) (0.047) (0.049) (0.046) (0.050) (0.049)
0.056 0.053 0.047 0.056* 0.059* 0.061* 0.054* 0.055Credit 
rating (0.035) (0.038) (0.037) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.032) (0.035)
0.256** 0.255** 0.271** 0.286* 0.252** 0.250** 0.246** 0.250*Difficulties in provi-
ding own resources (0.125) (0.119) (0.118) (0.111) (0.129) (0.120) (0.118) (0.130)
-0.031 -0.031* -0.026 -0.033* -0.030* -0.031* -0.030* -0.029No. of employees  
(log) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
-0.038 -0.040* -0.041* -0.032 -0.036 -0.034 -0.041* -0.042*Age (log) 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025)
0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.004 0.009 0.012 0.011Export activity prior to 
project start (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045)
-0.001 0.003 0.012 0.016 0.013 0.013 0.007 0.006Size of region 
(log) (0.041) (0.044) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.022) (0.023)
0.012 0.010 -0.046 -0.051 -0.047 -0.042 -0.041 -0.039Inverse Mills Ratio  
(from model 2) (0.023) (0.024) (0.053) (0.053) (0.056) (0.054) (0.053) (0.055)
R2 adjusted 0.372 0.372 0.303 0.319 0.296 0.300 0.301 0.298
VIF (mean) 2.14 2.13 2.16 2.28 2.17 2.24 2.19 2.23
No. of observations 301 301 301 301 301 301 301 301
***, **, *: statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level. Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors are estimated 
using bootstrapping with 500 replications. All models include industry dummies, time dummies for the year a firm applied to 
the program and a dummy for a location in Eastern Germany. 
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from other public funding sources. We even find two negative interaction effects for input 
additionality in case of other public funding and industry clusters, and no public funding and 
knowledge clusters. Our results therefore suggest that focusing public funding on firms 
located in clusters, which is the case for the ‘Innovative SMEs’ scheme as cluster firms tend 
to self-select into the program and program managers tend to favor applicants from clusters to 
some extent, does not help maximize the program’s impacts. We hence have to reject our 
third hypothesis. The ‘SME Innovative’ program does not seem to profit from general 
positive effects of industry clusters on firms’ R&D investment as found in other studies 
(Gerlach et al. 2009). Our result suggests that likely positive cluster effects from knowledge 
spillovers within a cluster are compensated by likely negative effects from lock-in or a lack of 
openness. 
Despite the absence of effects of geographical clustering, the input additionality model shows 
positive contribution of the ‘Innovative SMEs’ scheme to the change in R&D intensity of 
subsidized SMEs. Funded firms have increased their R&D intensity by 8 to 9 percentage 
points compared to firms that applied to the program but did not receive public support. We 
find a much higher positive effect for other public R&D funding (19 percentage point increase 
in R&D intensity, significant at the 1 percent level). These results imply that subsidizing the 
R&D expenditure of SMEs has been highly effective. One should note, however, that there 
was a severe economic recession during the period analyzed which made financing of R&D 
difficult for many SMEs. Access to public funds clearly made a difference and helped firms to 
maintain a level of R&D they would otherwise have had to reduce. 
When controlling for the pre-level R&D intensity, there are hardly any significant impacts of 
our other control variables on the change in R&D intensity. Neither the type of the project nor 
a firm’s general financial situation substantially affects changes in R&D intensity. We find a 
positive impact for firms that reported difficulties in providing own resources for co-financing 
the project submitted to the scheme. This result suggests that the program administration was 
capable of focusing subsidies on those SMEs which needed it most. 
With respect to output additionality (table 4), we find a negative impact of the program. SMEs 
funded through the ‘Innovative SMEs’ scheme show a significantly lower level of sales with 
new products originating from the funded project compared to SMEs that were able to co-
fund their rejected project through another public program, or that funded the project entirely  
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Table 4: Estimation results of output additionality of the ‘Innovative SMEs’ scheme: 
estimated coefficients of cross-section tobit models 
No interaction eff. Industry cluster Technology cluster Knowledge cluster Dependent variable:  
Sales share of new 
products from project 
absolute 
measure 
relative 
measure 
absolute 
measure 
relative 
measure 
absolute 
measure 
relative 
measure 
absolute 
measure 
relative 
measure 
Cluster variable: -0.575 1.913 -0.590 2.904   
industry cluster (0.672) (2.346) (0.823) (4.217)   
Cluster variable: 0.357 -2.751 0.590 70.938  
technology cluster (0.290) (26.327) (0.715) (64.212)  
Cluster variable: -0.434 -1.342  0.495 1.895
knowledge cluster (0.898) (2.265)  (2.168) (4.996)
-0.447*** -0.440*** -0.475*** -0.425** -0.417** -0.345* -0.402** -0.369**‘Innovative SMEs’ 
funding (0.136) (0.141) (0.171) (0.188) (0.184) (0.180) (0.163) (0.154)
-0.071 -0.089 -0.205 -0.028 0.036 0.092 0.030 0.034Other public  
funding (0.170) (0.169) (0.197) (0.232) (0.209) (0.231) (0.181) (0.175)
 0.321 -0.976 -0.266 -58.526 -1.044 -4.086Interaction: cluster &  
‘Innovative SMEs’   (0.991) (4.891) (0.794) (65.778) (2.199) (4.888)
 1.464 -2.108 -0.700 -88.253 -3.233 -6.346Interaction: cluster &  
other funding  (1.371) (5.921) (0.936) (82.025) (3.442) (5.968)
-0.176 -0.142 -0.149 -0.159 -0.190 -0.191 -0.077 -0.085R&D to sales ratio  
before project start (0.236) (0.257) (0.254) (0.246) (0.246) (0.245) (0.223) (0.229)
0.448* 0.483** 0.438* 0.479** 0.454** 0.445** 0.529** 0.512**Change in R&D to 
sales unit project end (0.250) (0.223) (0.233) (0.226) (0.232) (0.225) (0.250) (0.224)
-0.189 -0.198 -0.206* -0.217 -0.220* -0.223* -0.216* -0.210*Cooperative 
project (0.126) (0.125) (0.124) (0.134) (0.131) (0.127) (0.122) (0.118)
-0.143** -0.136** -0.135** -0.134** -0.135** -0.135** -0.134** -0.134**No. of employees  
(log) (0.059) (0.053) (0.057) (0.057) (0.055) (0.059) (0.057) (0.052)
-0.097 -0.092 -0.087 -0.091 -0.096 -0.095 -0.075 -0.079Age (log) 
(0.073) (0.073) (0.071) (0.074) (0.072) (0.070) (0.073) (0.067)
0.009 0.013 -0.017 -0.015 -0.014 -0.011 0.015 0.024Size of region 
(log) (0.063) (0.066) (0.050) (0.046) (0.045) (0.051) (0.063) (0.071)
-0.382** -0.368** -0.385** -0.376** -0.377** -0.369** -0.416** -0.406**Inverse Mills Ratio  
(from model 2) (0.170) (0.163) (0.164) (0.175) (0.169) (0.174) (0.170) (0.168)
R2 adjusted 0.211 0.210 0.212 0.209 0.211 0.213 0.213 0.214
VIF (mean) 2.34 2.38 2.42 2.64 2.47 2.60 2.69 2.85
No. of observations 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206
***, **, *: statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level. Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors are estimated 
using bootstrapping with 500 replications. All models include industry dummies, time dummies for the year a firm applied to 
the program and a dummy for a location in Eastern Germany. 
from their own sources. A main driver for this result is that many SMEs subsidized by 
‘Innovative SMEs’ were not yet able to market a product which resulted from the funded 
project. This does not imply project failure, but may reflect different levels of ambition 
among ‘Innovative SMEs’ projects and non-funded projects which results in differences in 
short-term commercial success. It should not be forgotten, that our measure of innovation 
output refers to sales of new products shortly after product launch. Immediate commercial 
success of new product developments tends to be higher for less ambitious product 
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innovations, e.g. adaptations of existing products or customer-specific, further developments 
of technologies. Such innovations often respond to a demand explicitly articulate by users and 
are rather easy to market. Firms developing more substantial innovations are less likely to 
generate significant sales directly after the development project. This is result of the greater 
efforts required in marketing the product, and the potential need to adapt technology after 
initial user experiences (see Colombo et al. 2014).  
There is evidence in the survey data suggesting that the projects of control group firms are 
less risky and closer to the market than those selected for funding. This is not surprising since 
the control group consists of firms that completed the unsuccessfully submitted project using 
only their own funds. Firms are more likely to do this if projects are low risk, and spillovers 
are low, than if projects are more radical and thus higher risk. The heterogeneity in innovative 
ambition is partially, but perhaps not fully, captured by our control variables on project 
characteristics (strategic research vs. further developing established technologies). The 
significant and negative coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio also points in this direction, as is 
it implies that there are unobserved variables that increase the probability of receiving funding 
from the scheme and at the same time lower the output variable. 
5. Conclusion 
We use data from a German innovation program, ‘Innovative SMEs’ that provides grants to 
SMEs for conducting R&D projects to examine the role of geographical clustering for the 
effectiveness of the funding scheme. While the program is not specifically focused on 
supporting clusters, it may leverage the existence of clusters to maximize the impact of 
government investment by allocating funding to firms located in clusters and generate higher 
impacts by exploiting positive cluster effects. 
We find that firms located in a cluster are more likely to participate in the program. This 
result is consistent for all three cluster measures used; industry, technology and knowledge 
clusters. We are unable to determine whether this result is due to information spillovers 
among cluster firms concerning funding opportunities, or whether it reflects program 
promoting activities targeted at clusters. We also find that the program administration tends to 
select projects from firms that are located in knowledge clusters but not in industry or 
technology clusters. This finding may reflect the greater ability of program managers to 
28 
observe knowledge clusters (which are determined by the location of large research facilities 
at universities, national laboratories or large corporations).  
We do not find any impact of geographical clustering on the program effectiveness either in 
terms of input additionality (change in R&D intensity) or output additionality (sales with new 
products). What we do find is a positive impact of the program on SMEs’ increase in R&D 
expenditure, and a negative impact on innovation output, irrespective of whether funded firms 
are part of a geographical cluster. The positive input additionality may be driven by the 
specific economic environment as the reference period (2007/08 to 2010/11) was 
characterized by a severe recession that posed a considerable challenge to SMEs in terms of 
funding their R&D. The availability of public funding sources clearly eased this situation and 
allowed funded firms to maintain or expand their R&D activities where these would otherwise 
have had to be reduced. The negative output additionality may reflect unobserved 
heterogeneity in the innovative ambition of publicly funded and non-funded projects, the 
former heading for more radical innovations which need more time to be placed in the market.  
The findings of our study are in line with those of Nishimura and Okamuro (2011a,b) who 
also did not find significant effects of cluster participation and direct R&D subsidies for firms 
in clusters on R&D productivity. The lack of higher input additionality for firms in a 
geographical cluster corresponds with the findings of Falck et al. (2010) who showed that 
R&D expenditures of firms in a cluster program’s target industries decreased. While these 
studies looked at the effects of dedicated cluster programs, our study extends the impact 
analysis of geographical clustering in innovation support programs to a scheme which goal is 
not to support clustering but cutting-edge technologies, though in practice it favors firms from 
clusters.  
While our results must be viewed with some caution as they refer to short term program 
effects in an economic turbulent period, we can still derive some tentative policy conclusions. 
Firstly, innovation programs can have effects on geographical clustering even if the program 
is not designed to support clusters. Two selection mechanisms are responsible for indirect 
impacts. Firms from clusters strongly select into the scheme, and the program management 
tends to favor projects from cluster firms. Secondly, this implicit cluster orientation of the 
program does not transfer into higher program impacts with regard to the firms’ innovative 
capacities or innovative performance, at least not in the short run. There is hence little 
justification for the observed focus on geographical clusters. The program might instead 
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expand its impacts by motivating more firms not located in geographical clusters to 
participate in the program, e.g. by advertising the program outside established routes such as 
industry fairs, industry associations, and research and technology organizations as these tend 
to be located in clusters. 
Our findings may challenge a common believe in current innovation policy in Germany and 
Europe, i.e. that supporting innovation through regional co-operation is beneficial. We cannot 
provide evidence that public money for innovation is better allocated if it is distributed to 
firms in clusters. Our results rather suggest that programs should balance between 
geographical clustering (in order to utilize positive effects of localized knowledge spillovers) 
and openness of innovation projects to inputs from anywhere in the world. For cluster funding 
programs, this would imply to link local cluster development with an internationalization 
perspective. German innovation policy recently took up this approach in the context of the 
new Spitzencluster initiative which provides support for international networking of clusters. 
As part of future research, it would be worth analyzing likely indirect cluster effects of 
technology programs by looking at other programs within Germany and in other countries. It 
would also be interesting to compare the impacts of dedicated cluster programs with those of 
R&D programs that indirectly support firms in clusters via the selection mechanisms 
described above.  
A main shortcoming of this study is the lack of information on how firms are embedded in 
their geographical clusters, i.e. which linkages they have with other actors in the cluster. It 
may well be the case that both the higher propensity of cluster firms to participate in the 
program, and the program management’s choice to favor projects from cluster firms, is driven 
by firms strongly embedded in clusters. One may also expect differences in the program’s 
input and output additionality impacts if one controls for heterogeneity in the firms’ cluster 
involvement. We leave this to future research. 
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics for Models 1 and 2 
Model 1 Model 2  Measure-
ment 
Data source 
Obs. # Mean Std. D. Min Max Obs. # Mean Std. D. Min Max 
Application to ‘Innovative SMEs’  0/1 Program data 6,701 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00      
Funding from ‘Innovative SMEs’  0/1 Program data      1,712 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Industry cluster, absolute (1,000 firms) metric Destatis 6,701 0.07 0.11 0.00 1.04 1,712 0.09 0.12 0.00 1.04 
Technology cluster, absolute (1,000 patents ’98-‘10) metric Patstat 6,701 0.05 0.14 0.00 1.76 1,712 0.07 0.19 0.00 1.76 
Knowledge cluster, absolute (b€ funding ’00-’07) metric Profi 6,701 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.31 1,712 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.31 
Industry cluster, share (%) metric Destatis 6,701 2.88 3.07 0.00 41.5 1,712 2.99 2.95 0.00 27.8 
Technology cluster, share (%) metric Patstat 6,701 0.83 1.47 0.00 18.2 1,712 0.79 1.41 0.00 15.6 
Knowledge cluster, share (%) metric Profi 6,701 1.27 2.78 0.00 13.2 1,712 1.98 3.46 0.00 13.2 
Prior participation in technology programs  0/1 TS1, Profi 6,701 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 1,712 0.34 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Prior participation in other public programs 0/1 TS1, MIP 6,701 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00 1,712 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Prior participation in ‘Innovative SMEs’  0/1 TS1, Profi      1,712 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 
R&D to sales ratio prior to application metric TS1, MIP 6,701 0.10 0.20 0.00 1.00      
Share of graduates prior to application metric TS1, MIP 6,701 0.34 0.32 0.00 1.00      
Credit rating at time of application metric MUP 6,701 2.29 0.77 0.00 6.00 1,712 2.07 1.01 0.00 6.00 
Export activity prior to application 0/1 TS1, MIP 6,701 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00      
No. of employees, full-time equivalents ln, metr. TS1, MIP 6,701 3.13 1.13 0.00 5.58 1,712 2.93 1.25 0.00 5.58 
Age in years ln, metr. MUP 6,701 2.67 1.02 0.00 7.61 1,712 1.99 1.17 0.00 5.09 
Location in Eastern Germany 0/1 MUP 6,701 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 1,712 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Size of the region (b€ GDP) ln, metr. Destatis 6,701 8.95 1.06 6.84 11.48 1,712 9.25 1.12 6.87 11.48 
Project focuses on strategic research 0/1 TS1      1,712 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Project further develops established technologies 0/1 TS1      1,712 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 
Cooperative project 0/1 TS1      1,712 0.88 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Barrier: scheme misses fields of technology 0/1 TS1      1,712 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Barrier: difficulties in providing own resources 0/1 TS1      1,712 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Active guidance by program administration 0/1 TS1      1,712 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Budget available per submitted proposal (m€) metric Program data      1,712 0.52 0.32 0.11 1.36 
Share of SME potential previously funded  metric Profi      1,712 0.09 0.14 0.01 0.55 
Inverse Mills ratio metric Model 1      1,712 0.80 0.52 0.00 3.14 
Source: TS1: telephone survey of SMEs having applied to the ‘Innovative SMEs’ scheme; MIP: Mannheim Innovation Panel; Destatis: Federal Statistical Office of Germany; Patstat: Patent 
database of the European Patent Office; Profi: Database on funding activities of the Federal Government; MUP: Mannheim Enterprise Panel. 
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Table A2: Descriptive Statistics for Models 3  
Variables Model 3: Input Model 3: Output 
 
Measure-
ment 
Data Source
Obs. # Mean Std. D. Min Max Obs. # Mean Std. D. Min Max 
Change in R&D to sales ratio until project end metric TS2, TS1 301 0.05 0.32 -1.00 1.00 206 0.05 0.29 -0.93 1.00 
Share of sales with new products resulting from the 
project per total sales at the end of the project 
metric TS2      
206 0.20 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Industry cluster, absolute metric Destatis 301 0.09 0.12 0.00 0.62 206 0.09 0.13 0.00 0.63 
Technology cluster, absolute metric Patstat 301 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.41 206 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.41 
Knowledge cluster, absolute metric Profi 301 0.16 0.21 0.00 1.28 206 0.17 0.20 0.00 1.21 
Industry cluster, share metric Destatis 301 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.28 206 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.15 
Technology cluster, share metric Patstat 301 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.13 206 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.13 
Knowledge cluster, share metric Profi 301 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.13 206 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.13 
Funding from ‘Innovative SMEs’  0/1 TS2 301 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 206 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Funding from other programs  0/1 TS2 301 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 206 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Project completion without public funding 0/1 TS2 301 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00      
R&D to sales ratio before project start metric TS1 301 0.22 0.26 0.00 1.00 206 0.24 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Patent stock per employee at project start metric Patstat 301 0.06 0.38 0.00 5.95      
Cooperative project 0/1 TS1 301 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00 206 0.78 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Strategic research 0/1 TS1 301 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00      
Credit rating at project start metric MUP 301 2.24 0.90 0.00 6.00      
Barrier: difficulties in providing own resources 0/1 TS1 301 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00      
Project further developed established technologies  0/1 TS1 301 2.81 1.23 0.00 5.52 206 3.14 1.16 0.00 5.50 
No. of employees at project start ln, metr. TS1 301 2.22 0.97 0.00 5.02 206 2.15 1.07 0.00 5.02 
Age in years ln, metr. MUP 301 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00      
Size of the region (GDP in b€) ln, metr. Destatis 301 9.28 1.06 7.28 11.48 206 9.32 1.15 7.12 11.48 
Inverse Mills ratio metric Model 2 301 1.29 0.44 0.36 2.92 206 1.18 0.41 0.32 2.64 
Source: TS1: telephone survey of SMEs having applied to the ‘Innovative SMEs’ scheme; TS2: telephone survey of SMEs having applied to the ‘Innovative SMEs’ scheme at the time of project 
end; Destatis: Federal Statistical Office of Germany; Patstat: Patent database of the European Patent Office; Profi: Database on funding activities of the Federal Government; MUP: Mannheim 
Enterprise Panel. 
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Table A3: Correlation coefficients for model variables of model 1 
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10 a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 a16 a17 a18 a19 a20 a21 a22 a23 a24 a25 a26 a27 a28 a29 a30 a31
a1 Participation in ‘Innovative SMEs’ 1.00
a2 Industry cluster, abs. 0.10 1.00
a3 Knowledge cluster, abs. 0.18 0.00 1.00
a4 Technology cluster, abs. 0.04 0.03 -0.06 1.00
a5 Industry cluster, rel. 0.02 0.50 -0.10 0.27 1.00
a6 Knowledge cluster, rel. 0.16 -0.03 0.91 -0.06 -0.12 1.00
a7 Technology cluster, rel. -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.74 0.29 -0.04 1.00
a8 Size of reigon 0.17 0.15 0.63 0.01 0.10 0.72 0.04 1.00
a9 Prior participation in technology programs 0.18 -0.01 0.12 0.01 -0.02 0.11 -0.04 0.09 1.00
a10 Prior participation in other R&D programs 0.08 -0.06 0.03 -0.02 -0.06 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.24 1.00
a11 R&D to sales ratio before project start 0.37 -0.01 0.19 -0.04 -0.04 0.19 -0.09 0.15 0.27 0.08 1.00
a12 Share of graduates 0.38 0.21 0.28 -0.11 -0.05 0.28 -0.22 0.27 0.28 0.06 0.42 1.00
a13 No. of employees -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 0.06 0.04 -0.10 0.13 -0.11 0.02 0.04 -0.19 -0.36 1.00
a14 Age -0.33 -0.04 -0.15 0.07 0.09 -0.15 0.15 -0.11 -0.10 -0.05 -0.28 -0.36 0.34 1.00
a15 Credit rating -0.14 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.10 0.16 1.00
a16 Export activity prior to application 0.14 -0.09 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.13 0.08 0.09 -0.03 0.23 0.03 -0.04 1.00
a17 East Germany -0.08 -0.25 0.20 -0.23 -0.32 0.23 -0.27 -0.12 0.07 0.17 0.06 0.09 -0.06 -0.14 0.00 -0.08 1.00
a18 Sector 2 0.13 -0.13 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.05 0.16 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.16 0.01 1.00
a19 Sector 3 -0.02 -0.08 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.12 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.04 -0.08 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.00 -0.07 1.00
a20 Sector 4 0.00 -0.07 -0.11 0.21 0.02 -0.08 0.22 -0.07 -0.01 0.04 -0.08 -0.15 0.13 0.05 -0.01 0.08 -0.02 -0.13 -0.08 1.00
a21 Sector 5 -0.18 -0.05 -0.14 0.06 0.07 -0.13 0.15 -0.13 -0.13 -0.01 -0.18 -0.34 0.15 0.17 -0.02 0.09 0.01 -0.17 -0.09 -0.18 1.00
a22 Sector 6 -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 0.05 0.00 -0.04 0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.10 -0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 -0.07 -0.09 1.00
a23 Sector 7 0.23 0.33 0.29 -0.15 0.00 0.16 -0.22 0.17 0.05 0.01 0.15 0.39 -0.12 -0.19 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.13 -0.08 -0.15 -0.18 -0.07 1.00
a24 Sector 8 0.05 0.09 0.01 -0.07 0.02 0.05 -0.10 0.08 0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.19 -0.12 -0.09 -0.02 -0.10 -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 -0.07 -0.08 -0.03 -0.07 1.00
a25 Sector 9 -0.04 0.21 -0.06 -0.12 -0.05 0.01 -0.17 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.23 -0.13 -0.05 0.00 -0.17 0.05 -0.11 -0.06 -0.12 -0.15 -0.06 -0.12 -0.05 1.00
a26 Sector 10 0.13 -0.09 0.07 -0.09 -0.02 0.11 -0.14 0.09 0.21 0.03 0.43 0.24 -0.09 -0.15 0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.09 -0.05 -0.10 -0.12 -0.05 -0.10 -0.05 -0.08 1.00
a27 Sector 11 -0.18 -0.10 -0.09 -0.12 -0.05 -0.08 -0.11 -0.08 -0.16 -0.06 -0.16 -0.27 0.07 0.13 0.03 -0.16 -0.02 -0.13 -0.07 -0.14 -0.17 -0.07 -0.14 -0.06 -0.11 -0.09 1.00
a28 Sector 12 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.01 0.03 -0.10 0.03 -0.07 -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 -0.07 -0.08 -0.03 -0.07 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 1.00
a29 Application year 2008 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 1.00
a30 Application year 2009 0.06 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.43 1.00
a31 Application year 2010 0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.12 -0.02 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.30 -0.27 1.00  
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Table A4: Correlation coefficients for model variables of model 2 
b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 b10 b11 b12 b13 b14 b15 b16 b17 b18 b19 b20 b21 b22 b23 b24 b25 b26 b27 b28 b29 b30 b31 b32 b33 b34 b35 b36 b37 b38
b1 Receiving subsidies from ‘Innovative SMEs’ 1.00
b2 Industry cluster, abs. -0.04 1.00
b3 Knowledge cluster, abs. 0.02 -0.04 1.00
b4 Technology cluster, abs. 0.06 -0.06 -0.09 1.00
b5 Industry cluster, rel. 0.02 0.58 -0.14 0.27 1.00
b6 Knowledge cluster, rel. 0.02 -0.09 0.92 -0.09 -0.16 1.00
b7 Technology cluster, rel. 0.08 -0.12 -0.03 0.75 0.28 -0.02 1.00
b8 Size of reigon 0.00 0.08 0.68 -0.05 0.03 0.75 0.01 1.00
b9 No. of employees 0.04 -0.06 -0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.05 0.11 -0.09 1.00
b10 Age 0.02 -0.01 -0.08 0.07 0.08 -0.10 0.14 -0.12 0.43 1.00
b11 Credit rating 0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.06 0.49 1.00
b12 East Germany 0.01 -0.26 0.33 -0.20 -0.32 0.38 -0.20 0.03 0.00 -0.09 -0.04 1.00
b13 Sector 2 0.02 -0.23 0.07 0.19 -0.02 0.02 0.28 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04 1.00
b14 Sector 3 0.01 -0.09 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.12 -0.02 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.05 -0.08 1.00
b15 Sector 4 0.05 -0.07 -0.16 0.19 0.05 -0.14 0.27 -0.14 0.20 0.13 -0.01 -0.08 -0.17 -0.07 1.00
b16 Sector 5 0.02 0.00 -0.12 0.07 0.09 -0.11 0.16 -0.12 0.12 0.14 0.04 -0.01 -0.12 -0.05 -0.11 1.00
b17 Sector 6 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 1.00
b18 Sector 7 -0.07 0.40 0.23 -0.23 0.01 0.09 -0.33 0.14 -0.07 -0.10 0.02 -0.01 -0.26 -0.11 -0.23 -0.16 -0.07 1.00
b19 Sector 8 -0.10 0.03 -0.01 -0.09 -0.01 0.05 -0.12 0.08 -0.09 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.10 -0.04 -0.09 -0.06 -0.03 -0.13 1.00
b20 Sector 9 -0.01 0.15 -0.09 -0.10 -0.04 -0.01 -0.15 0.00 -0.09 -0.09 -0.04 0.02 -0.12 -0.05 -0.10 -0.08 -0.03 -0.16 -0.06 1.00
b21 Sector 10 0.05 -0.16 -0.02 -0.13 -0.05 0.04 -0.19 0.03 -0.12 -0.11 -0.05 0.03 -0.16 -0.06 -0.14 -0.10 -0.04 -0.21 -0.08 -0.10 1.00
b22 Sector 11 0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.03 -0.07 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.09 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 1.00
b23 Sector 12 -0.04 -0.05 0.05 -0.06 -0.03 0.09 -0.09 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.07 -0.07 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.10 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 1.00
b24 Prior participation in technology programs 0.07 -0.07 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.20 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.13 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 0.08 -0.03 -0.05 1.00
b25 Prior participation in other R&D programs 0.04 -0.06 0.02 0.02 -0.07 0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.03 -0.38 1.00
b26 Prior participation in Innovative SMEs 0.08 0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 0.10 -0.03 -0.02 0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.02 1.00
b27 Project focuses on strategic research 0.08 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.05 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 1.00
b28 Project further develops establ. technologies -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.10 0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.02 1.00
b29 Cooperative project 0.09 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.07 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.05 -0.02 1.00
b30 Barrier: scheme misses fields of technology -0.07 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.08 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 1.00
b31 Barrier: diffic. in providing own resources -0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.05 -0.19 -0.12 -0.05 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 1.00
b32 Active guidance by program administration 0.16 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.02 -0.07 0.01 0.08 -0.01 1.00
b33 Available budget per proposal 0.21 -0.11 -0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.10 -0.11 -0.06 0.02 -0.18 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.20 -0.04 0.06 0.33 0.09 0.00 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.07 1.00
b34 Share of SME potential previously funded -0.07 -0.18 0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.06 0.05 0.02 -0.08 -0.06 0.01 0.03 0.22 -0.02 -0.14 -0.09 0.04 -0.19 -0.07 -0.04 0.23 -0.04 -0.03 0.18 -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.17 1.00
b35 jahr2008 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.12 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 -0.09 0.02 0.14 1.00
b36 jahr2009 0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.07 -0.02 -0.48 1.00
b37 jahr2010 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.02 -0.06 0.02 -0.07 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.02 0.06 -0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.00 -0.07 0.04 0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.03 0.10 -0.04 -0.03 -0.33 -0.33 1.00
b38 Inverse mills ratio 0.03 -0.10 -0.22 0.03 0.00 -0.18 0.08 -0.25 0.24 0.59 0.30 0.15 -0.12 0.08 0.09 0.36 0.10 -0.31 -0.05 0.05 -0.08 0.26 0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.10 0.05 0.06 0.07 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.01 -0.10 0.06 -0.16 0.06 1.00  
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Table A5: Correlation coefficients for model variables of model 3 
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 c15 c16 c17 c18 c19 c20 c21 c22 c23 c24 c25 c26 c27 c28 c29 c30 c31 c32 c33 c34 c35
c1 Change in R&D/sales ratio b. pr. start & end 1.00
c2 Industry cluster, abs. -0.01 1.00
c3 Knowledge cluster, abs. 0.08 -0.06 1.00
c4 Technology cluster, abs. -0.04 0.40 -0.15 1.00
c5 Industry cluster, rel. -0.05 0.60 -0.18 0.49 1.00
c6 Knowledge cluster, rel. 0.05 -0.11 0.93 -0.11 -0.20 1.00
c7 Technology cluster, rel. 0.00 0.39 -0.17 0.96 0.54 -0.14 1.00
c8 Size of reigon 0.09 0.10 0.67 0.00 0.02 0.72 -0.01 1.00
c9 ‘Innovative SMEs’ funding 0.03 -0.09 0.07 0.01 -0.08 0.10 0.04 -0.03 1.00
c10 Other public funding 0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.20 1.00
c11 Project completed without public funding 0.07 0.08 -0.02 0.00 0.07 -0.04 0.01 0.05 -0.26 -0.17 1.00
c12 Strategic research -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.09 -0.01 -0.14 0.17 -0.09 0.00 1.00
c13 Cooperative project -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.09 -0.08 -0.14 0.14 1.00
c14 R&D to sales before project start -0.45 -0.04 -0.01 -0.11 -0.01 0.05 -0.11 -0.03 -0.02 0.14 -0.05 0.06 0.00 1.00
c15 Patent stock at project start 0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.20 -0.01 -0.05 0.18 -0.07 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 1.00
c16 Difficulties in provi-ding own resources 0.10 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 -0.07 0.06 -0.08 -0.04 0.07 -0.01 1.00
c17 Credit rating -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.00 -0.05 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.03 -0.15 1.00
c18 No. of employees -0.16 -0.14 -0.06 0.03 -0.07 -0.05 0.01 -0.09 0.20 0.08 -0.16 0.06 0.05 -0.12 -0.17 -0.14 -0.01 1.00
c19 Age -0.18 -0.06 -0.14 0.14 -0.01 -0.11 0.13 -0.11 0.10 0.06 -0.20 0.03 0.06 -0.16 -0.04 -0.13 -0.01 0.51 1.00
c20 Export activity prior to project start -0.03 -0.21 0.11 -0.05 -0.10 0.08 -0.06 0.00 0.08 0.06 -0.07 0.02 -0.07 -0.03 0.05 -0.08 0.00 0.23 0.13 1.00
c21 East Germany 0.00 -0.29 0.40 -0.36 -0.34 0.39 -0.37 0.09 0.07 -0.02 -0.13 0.09 0.07 0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.09 0.08 1.00
c22 Sector 2 0.08 -0.24 -0.05 -0.08 -0.01 -0.05 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 0.18 0.04 -0.02 -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.04 -0.04 -0.12 0.14 0.04 1.00
c23 Sector 3 0.05 -0.09 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.01 -0.06 0.03 -0.07 0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.13 -0.04 0.02 0.09 0.04 -0.07 1.00
c24 Sector 4 -0.02 -0.07 -0.15 0.10 0.06 -0.13 0.14 -0.16 0.13 -0.01 -0.11 -0.05 -0.02 -0.17 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.27 0.22 0.05 -0.10 -0.17 -0.06 1.00
c25 Sector 5 -0.03 -0.03 -0.09 0.16 0.10 -0.10 0.13 -0.07 0.04 -0.02 -0.10 0.05 0.11 -0.09 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.11 0.10 0.04 -0.09 -0.09 -0.04 -0.08 1.00
c26 Sector 6 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 0.20 0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.07 0.06 -0.05 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 1.00
c27 Sector 7 0.03 0.40 0.11 -0.07 0.01 0.05 -0.11 0.13 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.02 -0.10 -0.13 0.07 -0.06 -0.08 -0.11 -0.02 -0.30 -0.12 -0.28 -0.15 -0.06 1.00
c28 Sector 8 -0.02 0.02 0.08 0.11 -0.02 0.07 0.07 0.07 -0.07 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.04 0.20 -0.17 -0.07 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.10 -0.04 -0.10 -0.05 -0.02 -0.18 1.00
c29 Sector 9 -0.05 0.10 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.07 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.05 0.09 -0.10 -0.07 0.02 -0.02 0.05 -0.12 -0.05 -0.11 -0.06 -0.02 -0.21 -0.07 1.00
c30 Sector 10 -0.02 -0.17 -0.04 -0.10 -0.08 -0.01 -0.08 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 0.14 0.03 0.02 0.30 0.00 0.07 0.04 -0.14 -0.11 -0.07 0.01 -0.14 -0.05 -0.13 -0.07 -0.03 -0.23 -0.08 -0.09 1.00
c31 Sector 11 0.00 -0.06 0.06 0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 0.03 0.06 -0.06 0.44 -0.02 -0.09 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.08 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 1.00
c32 Sector 12 0.01 -0.05 0.19 -0.07 -0.07 0.15 -0.07 0.07 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.06 0.07 -0.10 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.09 0.18 -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.10 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 1.00
c33 jahr2008 0.00 -0.06 -0.10 -0.03 0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.06 -0.10 0.05 0.10 -0.02 -0.08 0.05 -0.12 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.07 -0.01 0.02 0.06 0.12 0.07 -0.09 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 1.00
c34 jahr2009 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.14 0.05 -0.01 0.05 -0.08 0.07 -0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 0.12 0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.28 1.00
c35 Inverse mills ratio 0.02 0.09 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 -0.33 0.13 0.10 -0.19 -0.38 -0.03 0.07 0.16 -0.17 -0.17 -0.11 -0.14 -0.03 0.06 -0.04 -0.16 -0.09 0.01 0.09 0.33 0.04 -0.12 -0.07 0.00 0.05 0.06 1.00  
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Table A6: Correlation coefficients for model variables of model 4 
d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 d10 d11 d12 d13 d14 d15 d16 d17 d18 d19 d20 d21 d22 d23 d24 d25 d26 d27 d28 d29
d1 Sales share of new products from project 1.00
d2 Industry cluster, abs. -0.03 1.00
d3 Knowledge cluster, abs. -0.07 0.00 1.00
d4 Technology cluster, abs. -0.05 0.46 -0.10 1.00
d5 Industry cluster, rel. 0.00 0.60 -0.17 0.57 1.00
d6 Knowledge cluster, rel. -0.09 -0.04 0.91 -0.03 -0.19 1.00
d7 Technology cluster, rel. -0.03 0.44 -0.13 0.93 0.65 -0.08 1.00
d8 Size of reigon -0.04 0.15 0.64 0.02 0.00 0.71 0.01 1.00
d9 ‘Innovative SMEs’ funding -0.23 -0.03 0.10 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.14 0.04 1.00
d10 Other public funding 0.03 -0.03 -0.09 0.01 0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.07 -0.49 1.00
d11 R&D to sales before project start -0.06 -0.03 0.02 -0.11 -0.04 0.06 -0.11 0.03 -0.05 0.18 1.00
d12 Change in R&D/sales ratio b. pr. start & end 0.30 -0.07 0.02 0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.35 1.00
d13 Cooperative project -0.09 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.08 -0.07 0.17 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 1.00
d14 No. of employees -0.37 -0.05 -0.15 0.13 0.03 -0.13 0.11 -0.14 0.12 0.01 -0.14 -0.25 0.06 1.00
d15 Age -0.26 0.04 -0.07 0.17 0.03 -0.06 0.15 -0.01 0.10 0.06 -0.23 -0.12 0.05 0.46 1.00
d16 East Germany 0.05 -0.29 0.42 -0.34 -0.31 0.42 -0.34 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.07 0.02 0.04 -0.11 -0.08 1.00
d17 Sector 2 -0.01 -0.23 -0.13 -0.08 0.03 -0.10 -0.09 0.01 -0.07 0.14 0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.04 0.05 1.00
d18 Sector 3 0.02 -0.12 0.10 0.06 -0.06 0.14 0.02 0.06 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.05 -0.11 1.00
d19 Sector 4 -0.02 -0.10 -0.13 0.11 -0.04 -0.09 0.11 -0.16 0.14 -0.06 -0.20 0.01 -0.08 0.29 0.16 -0.11 -0.17 -0.07 1.00
d20 Sector 5 -0.01 -0.02 -0.12 0.22 0.05 -0.06 0.23 -0.18 0.03 0.07 -0.05 -0.03 0.09 0.11 0.07 -0.05 -0.13 -0.06 -0.09 1.00
d21 Sector 7 -0.02 0.41 0.13 -0.05 0.01 0.03 -0.11 0.10 -0.07 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.00 -0.04 -0.35 -0.15 -0.25 -0.18 1.00
d22 Sector 8 -0.10 0.00 0.18 -0.08 -0.03 0.15 -0.09 0.12 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.08 0.04 -0.09 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.12 1.00
d23 Sector 9 -0.05 0.18 -0.03 0.11 0.03 0.00 0.14 0.00 -0.03 0.08 0.13 -0.10 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.12 -0.05 -0.09 -0.06 -0.18 -0.04 1.00
d24 Sector 10 0.22 -0.17 -0.04 -0.17 -0.12 -0.06 -0.14 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 0.18 0.15 0.06 -0.20 -0.21 -0.02 -0.16 -0.07 -0.11 -0.09 -0.23 -0.06 -0.08 1.00
d25 Sector 11 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 -0.06 0.07 -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.13 0.13 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 1.00
d26 Sector 12 0.02 -0.05 0.19 -0.07 -0.09 0.15 -0.07 0.05 0.04 0.00 -0.08 0.02 0.08 -0.04 0.02 0.21 -0.08 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.11 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 1.00
d27 jahr2008 0.04 -0.13 -0.07 -0.01 -0.09 0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 0.08 -0.04 -0.03 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.04 -0.03 0.08 0.17 -0.08 0.05 -0.05 -0.08 0.07 0.03 1.00
d28 jahr2009 0.15 0.12 -0.10 0.00 0.09 -0.12 0.02 -0.10 -0.17 0.05 0.10 -0.07 -0.15 -0.05 -0.02 -0.07 -0.11 0.06 -0.08 0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.08 -0.02 -0.04 -0.23 1.00
d29 Inverse mills ratio -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.21 -0.13 -0.03 -0.28 0.00 -0.45 0.24 -0.02 -0.02 -0.33 -0.07 -0.09 -0.02 0.10 -0.07 -0.03 -0.16 0.15 0.24 -0.11 -0.07 -0.08 -0.03 0.10 -0.04 1.00  
 
